

Saving Public Colleges and Universities: An Urgent Call to Political Action

By *William Dale Crist*

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Crist was president and chairman of the Board of the California Public Employees Retirement System from 1992 until 2003. CalPERS is the largest public pension fund in the United States with \$170 billion in assets and 1.4 million members. During the 1990s he co-chaired the Council of Institutional Investors and was a member of the Council's Executive Committee. Crist was a founding member of the International Corporate Governance Network and a member of the ICGN's Board of Governors. He currently serves on the Board of the Pacific Pension Institute.

A founding member of the Thought & Action Review Panel and founding President pro tem of the California Faculty Association (CFA/NEA) in 1974, Crist was elected CFA President and board chair from 1976 to 1985, and continued on the CFA board as political action chair from 1987 to 1999.

The chapters on faculty benefits and retirement in prior *NEA Almanacs* emphasized the importance of aggressive collective bargaining for economic benefits and future pension security.¹ But we now have a sagging economy, inadequate political leadership, and an electorate that questions the value of good colleges. Such an environment—coupled with weak administrators and governing boards—makes real improvement in the economic security of faculty virtually unattainable.

Worse, the same factors threaten affordable student access to quality public higher education. We confront a societal challenge, not just a threat to our wages, benefits, and retirement security. Collective bargaining is part of the solution, but bargaining cannot get the job done without political power.

Most union leaders focus on assuring economic security for faculty. Reliable financial support offers this security while providing affordability for students.

It also enables faculty and students to work together with pride.² But public colleges confront a political and fiscal crisis when a weak economy generates low tax revenues.³ In the competition for tax dollars, politicians are more likely to support spending on “homeland protection,” personal safety, and basic social services than on higher education. The reason: the problems of public colleges are less visible than abject poverty and threats of violence.

Experience shows how politicians may threaten the academic and economic viability of public higher education. The campaign speeches of public officials may extol the value of—and pledge their undying support for—adequate financing. But, failing to understand the costs, these politicians withdraw support when pressed to satisfy the demands of powerful business, ideological, and military establishments, and to allay the fears of a population confronted with terrorism. The rhetoric of social concern in a complex

global environment is easy to deliver. But it's another thing to deliver public policy that places a well-educated labor force high on political priority lists.

Not all elected representatives are made of such fickle stuff, and identifying our champions is a worthy task. At the same time we must work to rid our legislatures of political leaders with self-serving agendas, lest their actions destroy quality higher education. Without aggressive action, political lip service to funding public education becomes standard fare. We must elect political leaders who are willing to be held accountable and who are open to forward-looking ideas.

Our higher education system must help us compete in the high tech world labor market. But to compete successfully, we must make quality postsecondary education accessible and affordable to citizens from all economic backgrounds.⁴ To this end, we have bargained collectively, debated in our academic senates, demonstrated beside our students for social justice, and dabbled in electoral politics and legislative advocacy. But, for the most part, we have failed. States have dramatically restricted enrollments, increased average class size, reduced the number of full-time tenure track faculty, and increased student fees.⁵

How do we elect and support our champions? Greed and fear, note experienced economists, are the two most powerful motivators in free market economies. Sadly, such economists are correct. We must use new strategies of outreach. Always easy to blame a failing, amorphous economy, we must recognize that faculty and administrators have not reached out to their communities. The public halls of ivy can no longer survive in isolation, or rely on automatic public support. Neutralized by an aversion to partisan politics, our leaders yield influence to advocates for other causes. Most public policy demands on government budgets are legitimate. But these advocates exploit the collective political weakness of higher education to assail our priorities. The result: US higher education is rapidly losing its preeminence.

CB ALONE WILL NOT SUCCEED

Federal legislation in 1947 prohibited labor unions from using regular union dues to support candidates for federal office, so many unions pooled member contributions to support endorsed political candidates. Congress and state legislatures subsequently enabled this pooling, and unions formed thousands of political action committees. In 1972,

NEA—not yet part of organized labor—became the first education association to form a political action committee (NEA-PAC). NEA actively supported political candidates and lobbied for pro-education legislation when it embraced collective bargaining.

NEA manages its political action arm under the rubric of “government relations.” To gain public support, the association changed the name of its campaign contribution fund from NEA-PAC to the NEA Fund for Children and Public Education. NEA's endorsement for federal political office carries considerable weight.⁶

In 1974, the California Teachers Association (CTA) moved to state level political action when twelve candidates for state and national office sought CTA endorsement.⁷ CTA, which then represented all levels of education in a single organization, had never endorsed a candidate for political office.⁸ Its governance body, after debating the wisdom of direct involvement in electoral politics, endorsed five candidates, including the gubernatorial candidacy of Jerry Brown. “CTA is [now] a viable part of the California political process,” stated a CTA publication.⁹ “Politically, we have arrived,” stated an association officer. “[Faculty] can be proud of their own participation and influence in this process. This is exactly the kind of power and backing we need when we sponsor legislation of particular interest to college and university professors here in California.”¹⁰

Good rhetoric. But 30 years of experience teaches us that neither lip service nor one-time stands on candidates or issues assures adequate financing for public colleges and universities. Let's explore the reasons.

By the early 1970s, a rising majority of public employees—including college and university faculty—demanded collective bargaining. California teachers supported collective bargaining because cooperation with school and university administrators, school boards, college trustees, and the state's political leadership failed to improve school funding. Teachers and professors in many other urban states, sharing this frustration, opted for collective bargaining as the only likely path to increased wages and benefits.

Federal labor law did not provide for public employee collective bargaining rights, so faculty leaders focused on obtaining enabling legislation from their states and on electing an exclusive representative. Their opponents: primarily college administrators and governing boards. In California, public school and community college employees received

statutory collective bargaining rights in 1976.¹¹ Governor Brown signed the K-14 legislation as promised and pledged to sign a collective bargaining bill covering the California State University (CSU)¹² and the University of California (UC) if it passed the legislature.¹³ But legislators—thinking that shared governance mechanisms gave university professors control over their own employment conditions—were reluctant to approve similar collective bargaining rights for faculty. Two more years of organizing and intensive lobbying finally led to passage of the bill covering university employees. The governor signed the legislation in September 1978.¹⁴

It took until summer 1983 to determine that the California Faculty Association (CFA) would represent the CSU faculty and to negotiate the first contract. During these five years, union members concluded that obtaining improved faculty salary and benefits depended equally on collective bargaining and on adequate state funding of higher education.

Jerry Brown, like Ronald Reagan before him, did not champion colleges and universities in his budget proposals.¹⁵ Other needs seemed more pressing. The governor repeatedly spoke of professors' "psychic income" during a bitter battle over adequate funding for faculty salaries before passage of the collective bargaining bill. Faculty, he added, should lower their expectations for improved compensation.¹⁶ Brown, supported and endorsed by all of public education, enabled collective bargaining for K-14 and university employees in California. But he failed to deliver public support for adequate funds to bargain over.

Collective bargaining, though now legally protected, was no panacea. Hoped-for gains depended on the political process, so CFA stepped up its legislative advocacy program. In 1981, the CSU appropriation proposed by Governor Brown was \$21 million less than the amount sought by the CSU trustees. Even CSU Chancellor Glenn Dumke referred to Brown's proposal as a "survival budget." The CFA president called on "each faculty member to begin informal contacts with state legislators to express concern for the CSUC budget and program."¹⁷ George Deukmejian, Brown's successor, proposed "Crippling Budget Cuts" for 1983-84 on top of the \$24 million in new student fees and expenditure cuts imposed during 1982.

All faculty members should complain to their legislators, be they Democrat or Republican, declared the chair of a CFA legislative committee, "that unless they provided adequate funding for CSU, our uni-

versities are doomed to fail."¹⁸ A 1984 union newspaper headline—"Governor's Budget Inadequate"—reflected the lack of political support; similar headlines regularly appeared for the next 20 years.¹⁹ But throughout the 1980s most university faculty members remained aloof from the "dirty" hands-on work needed to elect political representatives and to lobby aggressively.

Competition for tax revenues with K-12 public education hindered CFA-CTA collaboration. In 1988, CTA, the always-larger elementary and secondary level association, obtained passage of Proposition 98, a state constitutional amendment that guaranteed a minimum amount of state funding for elementary and secondary schools and community colleges.²⁰ Formulas related to the annual growth in state revenue determined the guaranteed amount. The education coalition that drafted the initiative excluded CFA, and the protective provisions of Proposition 98 explicitly omitted the universities—a classic example of zero-sum thinking.²¹

Protecting public school access and quality remains the advertised goal of CTA's efforts in lobbying, electoral politics, and coalition building. But excluding California's public universities from Proposition 98 made it harder to convince a suspicious public that these efforts did not reduce to narrow employee interests.

UNIONS: POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

It is not easy to convince voters that public K-12 education is worth the taxes. Convincing voters to subsidize public higher education is even more difficult. Many Americans might agree to award scholarships and grants to the "most deserving" students and faculty, but taxpayers today believe that strong controls must accompany institutional funding. Why?²²

Public policy, beginning with the 1862 Land-Grant Act, provided tax-based financial support for colleges and universities and their students, for the common good. Congress intended to provide more than a "deserved" benefit to returning military personnel when it enacted the 1944 GI Bill of Rights.²³ Expanding postsecondary education, believed legislators, would support economic growth and development. Federal support of the National Science Foundation in 1950 similarly recognized that better-funded research in public universities served the public good.

But student anti-war protests and civil disobedience captured the public's critical attention during the 1960s. During the 1970s, the labor market's high-tech orientation increased. Students and taxpayers—noting the growth of occupational curricula designed to satisfy individual responsiveness to the changing labor market—saw college degrees as tickets to better jobs.²⁴ The perception grew that postsecondary education only benefited individual recipients, not the common good.

Rapid advances in communication and information technology created a global economy during the 1990s. The labor forces in both emerging and developed economies required more higher education.²⁵ This development should have revived the belief that higher education served the common good and deserved public support. But in the US, the answer to the “who benefits” question remained “the individual.” Public subsidy for higher education met more resistance. Governors and legislatures encouraged tuition increases and reduced higher education funding requests. This powerful trend makes more privatizing of public higher education inevitable, absent faculty union resistance.²⁶

Tight government budgets hinder many public university administrators from contesting reduced institutional support. Needing to protect institutional integrity and to display fiduciary responsibility, administrators may make political agreements with governors and legislators behind closed doors, regardless of collective bargaining agreements. The 2004–05 California budget “negotiations”—which reduced current budget support and added accountability requirements in return for a promise of reliable future budget support—provide insight for faculty and staff in similar situations.²⁷

The “compacts” that emerged from these negotiations received national attention.²⁸ Aimed at providing fiscal stability, the compacts are six-year “agreements” that supposedly assure the two university systems a funding floor into the future. The price: no public opposition to massive cuts in the 2004–05 budget requests, or to essentially mandated increases in student fees. Also: acceptance of “accountability” measures that demonstrate student success and efficient use of resources.²⁹

Under Governor Davis, extreme mid-year allocation reductions from the State General Fund forced UC and CSU to announce severely restricted Spring 2004 student enrollments.³⁰ These restrictions pressured the community college system, also hamstrung

by budget cuts, to accept more students. After the recall of Davis in October 2003, Arnold Schwarzenegger, the newly elected governor, identified further immediate reductions in state spending—including an additional \$23.7 million cut in CSU's budget.³¹

During this period, the public university systems in California decided how to deal with budget cuts sustained in 2003 and how to present their 2004–05 budget proposals to the governor. CFA, working with the CSU administration, the Academic Senate, and student representatives, supported the budget approved for submission to the state government.³²

Students bear the burden when other demands on the public purse leave higher education short. Historically, CSU kept student fees relatively low to maintain affordable open-access higher education. But coming after heavy budget cuts in 2002–03, the 2003–04 State General Fund budget for CSU contained a seven-percent decrease. Student fees increased by 30 percent to avoid deep reductions in enrollments. Added to the 2002 mid-year fee increases, undergraduate and graduate fees increased by 43.0 percent and 49.8 percent respectively between fall 2002 and fall 2003.³³ And adding the proposed 2004–05 fee hikes—14 percent for undergraduates and 25 percent for graduates—brought the total two-year respective increases to 63 percent and 87 percent.³⁴

Given current economic realities, who can organize multi-year political plans to combat reduced funding and consequential fee increases? With top administrators trapped in political deal making and students on the move, it must be left to faculty members to save affordable public colleges and universities from extinction. Like it or not, unions are the only faculty organizations with the independent resources and long-term stability needed to mount effective electoral, lobbying, and coalition building political action campaigns.

The unprecedented funding shift from tax revenues to students during the past ten years places the burden on unions to promote the social value of colleges and universities. But this is not the usual or legally mandated union responsibility; it means moving resources from member demands for better wages and benefits. On its face, such a strategy appears an unlikely sell to the rank and file. Consequently, we have few tests of this strategy. But the story of how one NEA faculty union adopted this move illustrates how working for common good benefits students and faculty alike.

THE CFA EXPERIENCE

CSU's size and reputation, and CFA's aggressive 20-year history as the faculty's exclusive representative, make the union's evolving focus on public college finance and on adequate funding a good example to study, and perhaps to follow.

CFA's political action has significantly influenced public policy regarding union issues. This influence began with its early support of Jerry Brown's 1974 gubernatorial candidacy. In 1978, CFA lobbied extensively for the enabling collective bargaining legislation. As late as 1999, it secured important agency shop amendments to that law.³⁵ CFA also battled with political forces away from the bargaining table in an attempt to maximize the state's annual allocation to CSU. But because it generally did not agree with CSU's official recommendations and often differed with competing interests of students and other public employees, CFA lobbied from 1983 through 2003 without seeking coalition support. Standing alone, CFA used traditional independent political advocacy techniques to obtain favorable policy legislation and to fight the worst budget cuts, particularly in faculty positions. It also took an active role in electoral politics, with some successes, including the election of a few CFA members to important public offices.³⁶

After becoming the CSU faculty's exclusive representative in 1983, CFA increased its professional staff as its bargaining responsibilities grew, but it focused on negotiating and enforcing contracts. Internal budget arguments for increased organizing support were always more compelling than arguments for more political action funding. Consequently, the government relations staff expanded only slightly and the size of the political action fund remained unstable. Political advocacy emphasized year-to-year policy and budget issues, and the union did nothing to form long-term coalitions to support CSU. Such aloofness—almost a self-defeating independence—is characteristic of higher education unions. But neither shortsightedness nor aloofness explains the failure of CFA leaders to focus on the long-term objective of protecting the university itself. The failure was more a result of continued fixation on retaining recognition and engaging in bargaining and contract enforcement to achieve what seemed to be in the immediate best interests of faculty.

But hard times required new tactics. Economic downturns and safety concerns related to terrorism

brought tax support of public colleges and universities to an unprecedented low level. Enrollments became more restricted, and student confronted extraordinary fee and tuition increases. Even the continued existence of affordable, quality public university education was (and is) threatened—and not only in California.³⁷

After 20 years of reliance on collective bargaining to improve members' economic security and academic integrity, CFA's leadership decided that the union must also work to preserve their members' university for the common good. This decision—not purely altruistic—flowed from a concern about the students, the socioeconomic health of California, and the need to expand dialogue between CSU faculty and the public.

In late 1999, CFA launched a committee to consider the "Future of the CSU: Toward a People's University" to conduct hearings on the university's future.³⁸ The committee would collaborate with other CSU groups, including campus academic senates, student organizations, and staff unions. The hearings would culminate in a statewide conference to articulate key components of quality university education and priorities necessary to achieve these components. The initial effort emphasized working toward a faculty-based vision of CSU and strengthening alliances with other CSU unions, local labor councils, students, and affiliates.³⁹ But, increasingly aware of the need to strengthen relationships and communications with the public, CFA also decided to participate in legislative hearings on California's Higher Education Master Plan—a state policy document detailing the cooperative interrelationships of the community colleges, CSU, and UC.⁴⁰

The high-tech bubble burst in 2000, but California's state tax revenues remained high. A good 2000-01 budget year diverted CFA's attention from its concern for the university's future. The outreach project continued, but internal politics and quarrels with the administration consumed the leadership's time. In other words: business and politics as usual.

Traditional political action techniques—supporting candidates and lobbying seated politicians—continued between 2000 and 2002. CFA broadened the goal of political campaign contributions in 2000 by changing the name of its Political Action Committee from CFA-PAC to the "Faculty for Our University's Future, a Committee Sponsored by the California Faculty Association."⁴¹ With plenty of general fund

money available, Governor Davis proposed substantial increases to university budgets, and agreed to a financing “pact” with UC and CSU.⁴² The union signed on because its objectives included slowing tuition and fee increases, expanding outreach programs, and increasing the number of transfer students from the state’s community colleges.⁴³

Politics as usual remained appropriate during 2002—an important election year with dark clouds on the economic horizon. CFA worked hard to reelect Davis and many higher education friendly legislators, and to defeat harmful ballot initiatives. Davis was reelected, but California’s tax revenues plunged throughout 2002, and times got hard again fast. By January 2003, education-friendly Gray Davis—confronted with a large budget deficit—proposed doubling community college tuition and cutting all higher education appropriations.⁴⁴

In 2003, all public colleges in California struggled to manage continuing budget cuts. In July, the CSU Trustees raised student fees by 30 percent and proposed leaving 2,300 faculty positions open to avoid layoffs.⁴⁵ By September, CFA focused on supporting Davis in his recall challenge against top opposing candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger. Schwarzenegger won, and replaced Davis as governor in November.

Looking for new leverage, the union re-involved the public in a campaign for CSU’s future. CFA organized campus-based open meetings to discuss the budget cuts.⁴⁶ CFA, working with the CSU trustees, supported the formal 2004-05 budget request sent to the governor’s office in November.⁴⁷ But in December, Schwarzenegger’s “mid-year” cut reduced CSU’s budget by \$23.7 million.

The governor’s staff constructed CSU’s part of the budget in December without the advice of CSU Chancellor Charles Reed and without faculty input.⁴⁸ In January the governor released a budget requiring \$311 million in total cuts to CSU and proposing additional student fee increases—a net General Fund reduction of \$240 million. Following the budget’s release, the CSU Chancellor and the UC President began closed-door talks with the governor to mitigate these drastic cuts. Meanwhile, CFA stated that it was “beginning to work with other organizations...to help protect instruction.”⁴⁹

In February, CFA spearheaded a nonpartisan “Coalition to Save the CSU” to promote “awareness of CSU’S importance to the state and its economy.”⁵⁰ The coalition’s immediate goals: stopping the

CSU budget cuts and “saving” the university for the common good.⁵¹ It began the campaign by mailing thousands of solicitation letters. Media support followed, and by mid-March the coalition held its first press conference. CFA promoted the coalition on the Internet, and prepared professional, hard-hitting materials that did not mention the union, jobs, wages, or benefits. Membership quickly approached 1,000, including the State Treasurer, Coca-Cola Bottling Company of California, Arianna Huffington, and Tom and Dick Smothers.

On May 21, 2004, the CSU chancellor, the UC president, and the governor concluded a compromise “compact.” The compact “assured” relative budget stability for the two systems over the next six years—albeit at a lower controlled rate than would have been normally proposed.⁵² In exchange, the two systems would not openly oppose the destructive budget cuts.

CFA, the coalition, and many legislative leaders opposed the “compact.” The agreement, opponents said, though not a legal document and not binding on the legislature, reduced the ability of legislators to oppose the governor’s budget proposal. Opponents targeted the increase in student fees that began immediately and would extend for six additional years.

Even more devastating than student fee hikes: the governor’s \$240 million cut in the CSU budget meant unavoidable restrictions on CSU and UC enrollments. Postpone your enrollment, the governor told thousands of students. The coalition opposed “closing the doors to qualified students [because] we believe this will impair the long-term growth of the economy, as well as the competitiveness of California businesses.”⁵³ Coalition and CFA lobbying continued, and by July 29, 2004, the date of the budget’s final approval, \$40 million of the proposed \$240 million reduction was restored.

What role did the compact play? “The higher education compact signed with the governor played a pivotal role in reaching the results we have today,” stated the Chancellor.⁵⁴ In contrast: “While CFA is disappointed that more 2004/05 dollars were not restored to the CSU,” noted a CFA release, “we are pleased that despite a Compact agreement between the governor and the CSU Chancellor that prematurely undercut negotiations, the CSU funding increase [was granted].”⁵⁵

The truth: the original cuts might have stood absent effective coalition lobbying, employee and

student action, and the UC-CSU-gubernatorial negotiations.⁵⁶ The willingness and ability of the California legislature to agree with the governor on the state budget is always uncertain to the last moment. Crediting any one force for replacing the \$40 million, which funded the access of the approximately 7,000 students, is not useful. The only certainty: CFA-CSU collective bargaining could not have accomplished the end result that was unarguably for the common good.

CONCLUSION: BEYOND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

There are many demands on tax revenues at all levels of government. The public feels that priorities of public safety, national defense, and K-12 public education serve the common good, but that higher education mostly serves the individual recipients. It is easy for political leaders to cut public college and university budgets when economic conditions worsen. Many leaders in business, organized labor, the arts, and public service understand the social and macroeconomic value of affordable, open access, high quality public higher education. But without organizations that lead, the din of political deal making drowns out the voices favoring improved, reliable tax support of public higher education.

Union members who work in public colleges and universities should encourage their unions to recognize the value of a strong political action program that makes broad coalition building the top priority. Public higher education employees who attempt to maintain or improve their own economic security will fail without strong public support. What's more, organizing broad coalitions to support public colleges and universities is for the common good.

NOTES

¹ Chronister, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Crist, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004. These analyses provide an historical perspective on advocacy for improved faculty benefits in a changing economic and political environment. Knowing this history over at least two past business cycles is invaluable for negotiators and faculty leaders who seek long-term financial security through personal retirement planning, collective bargaining, and political action.

² Zumeta, 2004.

³ Zumeta, 2002, 2003; Crist, 2004.

⁴ See <http://www.bls.gov/opub/oooq/1999/fall/oochart.pdf>.

⁵ Zumeta, 2004, 69. For current labor demand data see <http://www.bls.gov/bls/proghome.htm>.

⁶ NEA has 2.7 million members working at levels of education. It has affiliates in every state and is aggressive in electoral politics and lobbying at the federal and state levels. NEA and its affiliate publications reach millions of readers who have become one of the most unified and militant grass-roots groups in the US.

⁷ CTA is the NEA's largest statewide affiliate, as it was in 1974.

⁸ The CTA/NEA higher education arm in California was called the California College and University Faculty Association (CCUFA). CCUFA became part of the Congress of Faculty Associations in December 1974, which became the California Faculty Association (CFA) in 1983. CFA, still affiliated with CTA and NEA, is the exclusive bargaining agent for 23,000 CSU faculty members.

⁹ *The California Professor*, October, 1974, 1.

¹⁰ Ibid. Kappel and Howell (2002, B13) write, "A resurgence in the political power of PAC's would be a welcome development for institutions of higher education."

¹¹ California Educational Employment Relations Act, 1975.

¹² CSU is the largest system of senior higher education in the country, with 23 campuses, approximately 410,000 students, and 44,000 employees (<http://www.calstate.edu>).

¹³ The University of California is a system of ten campuses and approximately 200,000 students (<http://www.ucop.edu/welcome1.html>).

¹⁴ California Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act, 1978.

¹⁵ Passage of the infamous Proposition 13 in 1978 froze salaries of California State University and College professors, and threatened faculty layoffs and even campus closures. Governor Brown called for a ten percent across-the-board reduction in the CSU budget. Staff reductions were so great that the also infamous Peter Diamandopoulos, then president of Sonoma State College, stated, "There is a new mood of austerity afoot...and I am requesting that every Sonoma State College employee—administrator, staff and faculty—work longer hours without extra compensation" (*Los Angeles Times*, June 23, 1978).

¹⁶ *The Psychic Income Story*. Congress of Faculty Associations, August, 1977.

¹⁷ *The California Professor*, February 1981, 1.

¹⁸ *The CFA California Professor*, February/March, 1983, 1.

¹⁹ "Governor's Budget Inadequate," *The CFA California Professor*, February, 1984. Ten years later, the headline in the union's newspaper read "Wilson's Budget Imperils the CSU," *California Professor*, Fall, 1994.

²⁰ See the brief description of Proposition 98—The Classroom Instructional Improvement and Accountability Act—at http://www.edsource.org/pub_update_prop98.cfm. Goldfinger, 1988, provides detailed information.

²¹ California's community colleges were included in Proposition 98 because they, like K-12 public schools, had relied primarily on local tax revenues before Proposition 13 placed that responsibility on the state budget. CFA, seeking inclusion in a revenue protection initiative, was represented on the original Long Range Finance Task Force established to draft the language of the initiative in 1987. But by early 1988 CFA was no longer included in the CTA-controlled task force meetings. The language drafted for what became Proposition 98 excluded CSU and UC. But CFA continued to support the proposition in the spirit of unified education, though its leaders knew that it might damage CSU's budget expectations (*CFA Board Minutes*, 1/30-31/87; 8/26-27/88; 12/9-10/88).

²² Other countries rarely allocate less revenue to fund public education. "Most Canadians want their government to spend more money on higher education according to an opinion poll conducted by the Association of Colleges of Canada." More than 75 percent of respondents felt that higher education financial support "should come from public funds rather than tuition. Nearly 90 percent of the respondents called this spending a good long-term investment for the country" (Birchard, A32).

²³ "Dire economic predictions for the post-war years created a great pressure to pass offsetting legislation. Many saw a postwar America faced with the loss of millions of jobs, creating unprecedented unemployment. Many business and government leaders anticipated a widespread economic depression after the war. As early as 1942, plans were being made to handle the anticipated postwar problems. The National Resources Planning Board, a White House agency, had studied postwar manpower needs and in June 1943 recommended a series of programs for education and training" (http://www.gibill.va.gov/education/GI_Bill.htm).

²⁴ Zemsky, 2003, B7.

²⁵ "The demands [for public higher education] are soaring while state appropriations are shrinking, and it will take much more than an improved economy to close the gap between institutional needs and available resources" (Conklin and Reindl, 2004, B20).

²⁶ The willingness to replace tax support with higher student fees," concluded Robert Zemsky (2003, B7) has reached the point where "many of the nation's best-known public institutions have become like private ones." Other observers came to similar conclusions: "This economic downturn is likely to bring on the next wave in privatization of public higher education" (Selingo, 2003, A1). "The public is no longer interested in our [academics] truth, no longer prepared to subsidize our academic pursuits. So our

budgets fall, and we increase fees, commodify learning, turn admissions into market ventures, contract out research to corporations, and search out donors. We have to demonstrate our public worth" (Burawoy, 2004, B24).

²⁷ In 2000, the CSU Chancellor, the UC President, and Governor Davis had agreed to a financing "pact" when the governor proposed increased higher education funding (Hardi and Hebel, 2000). Budgets declined a year later, and by 2002 California voters, confronted with a \$38 billion deficit, recalled Davis. CSU Chancellor Reed, speaking of the apparent need for drastic action after the first budget proposals of Governor Schwarzenegger said: "We saw the bottom falling out back in 2001 when Gray Davis was Governor and could not fulfill the compact we had then" (Interview with Chancellor Charles Reed, August 26, 2004).

²⁸ Hebel, 2004.

²⁹ The text of simultaneously released press statements from CSU and UC show near-identical praise of Governor Schwarzenegger for "his exceptionally strong commitment to higher education, his leadership and his recognition that these universities have a central role to play in creating the California of tomorrow." Both statements thanked state legislators for their "continued support," and especially to members "who have been steadfast advocates" for higher education (<http://www.calstate.edu/pa/news/2004/compact.shtml> and <http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/compact/ucpressrelease.html>).

³⁰ Crist, 2004, 93.

³¹ "Governor Proposes Mid-Year Budget Cuts," *CFA Headlines*, November 25, 2003, 1. About \$11.3 million of the cut was unspecified, but \$12.4 million would come out of the outreach program, which promoted student access and diversity.

³² "CFA Supports 2004/05 CSU Budget Proposal," *CFA Headlines*, November 25, 2003.

³³ "CFA Research Brief #6: 2003-2004 Budget."

³⁴ See CSU student fee history at "<http://www.calstate.edu>." The "compact" between the CSU Chancellor and Governor Schwarzenegger included student fee increases for 2004-05. It also provided for eight percent increases in 2005-06 and in 2006-07 (<http://www.calstate.edu/pa/news/2004/compact.shtml>).

³⁵ The 1999 amendment provided for statutory agency shop protection for the CSU faculty's collective bargaining unit, represented since 1983 by CFA. This guarantee of financial security for the exclusive representative has given CFA the resources necessary to engage in the costly political activity of building and maintaining a broad-based coalition of outside friends of the university to "save the university." See text of the Fair Share Bill, SB645, October 10, 1999 at <http://www.calfac.org/SBt45.html>.

³⁶ Three prominent examples: California State Senator Gloria Romero, a professor at CSU-Los Angeles served on the CFA Political Action Committee and was first elected to the State Assembly in 1998. Also: Alan Lowenthal, professor at CSU-Long Beach, a CFA member elected to the State Assembly, and George Diehr a CFA chapter president at CSU-San Marcos elected to the CalPERS Board of Administration.

³⁷ Zumeta (2004, 71) agrees: "Many in higher education may now realize that its cuts in state appropriations result from structural factors, and are not just a function of the current trough in the economic cycle."

³⁸ CFA leaders first discussed the project in October, 1999 (CFA Board Minutes, October, 1999 and December, 1999). A draft mission statement for the project stated, "CFA's Future of the University project presents a rare opportunity for members of CSU communities and the larger public to engage in a democratic conversation about the purposes and performance of the [CSU]. Because CSU faculty are employed ultimately by the public, we look forward to initiating a broad dialogue with the communities, families and citizen groups of the state" (*CFA Board Minutes*, February, 2000).

³⁹ Misenhelder, 2000. The most troubling management initiatives and collective bargaining proposals failed to consider the faculty view of its professional role and the quality of education delivered. These proposals, CFA recognized, were consistent with national trends, not a local phenomenon (See also Rhoades, 1998).

⁴⁰ California's "Master Plan" has been used as a foundation for general fund budget and other policy decisions regarding CSU, UC, and the community colleges ("The History of The California Master Plan...", 2004).

⁴¹ In 1999, NEA-PAC changed its name to the NEA Fund for Children and Public Education.

⁴² Suggs, 2000.

⁴³ See note 27 above.

⁴⁴ Evelyn, 2003.

⁴⁵ "Trustees Vote to Raise Student Fees," *CFA Headlines*, July 22, 2003.

⁴⁶ "The whole issue of the budget was so central to the recall that it seemed likely to us that we were likely to on the table again," noted CFA President John Travis. "So we tried to devise a strategy that would make the argument that higher education had already suffered too many reductions." Interview with John Travis, August 25, 2004.

⁴⁷ In an unusual move, CFA, and the CSU Academic Senate supported the system's budget request ("CSU Trustees Approve \$546.6 Million Budget Request Increase for 2004-2005").

⁴⁸ Interview with Chancellor Charles Reed. August 26, 2004.

⁴⁹ "CFA Planning for State Budget Campaign," *CFA Headlines*, January 13, 2004. Referring to CFA's "Future of the CSU" project, CFA President Travis noted, "Several years ago CFA had sponsored some meetings throughout the state to talk about the future of the CSU and had met with community people then. So we started our search among members of the business community who had some association with the CSU as alumni. We asked our faculty and staff to ask people they came in contact with to join the coalition. We sent out the first letter to 2,500 on March 1, 2004, and by mid-April we had more than 1,200 people who had signed up to support the coalition" (Interview with John Travis, August 23, 2004).

⁵⁰ "CFA Reaches out to Build a Coalition," *CFA Headlines*, February 18, 2004.

⁵¹ See <http://www.calfac.org/savecsu.html>.

⁵² See note 29 above.

⁵³ Letter written to Governor Schwarzenegger and Legislative leaders signed by 15 California business leaders.

⁵⁴ "State Budget Agreement Restores Critical Funding for Higher Education."

<http://www.calstate.edu/PA/news/2004/budget0405.shtml>

⁵⁵ "Legislature Approves State Budget," *CFA Headlines*, July 29, 2004.

⁵⁶ When asked, "What was the effect of the coalition that CFA organized?" Chancellor Reed responded, "The coalition was very good it was really good and it was helpful" (Interview with Charles Reed, August 26, 2004).

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