

Faculty Union Organizing on the Research Campus

By John R. Magney

November 14, 1996 was a crisp fall day in Carbondale. As the morning sun warmed up the campus, faculty early birds walked over to the Student Center for the opening of the unionization vote.

The leadership of the Southern Illinois University Carbondale Faculty Association, IEA/NEA was nervously optimistic. A telephone canvass of their colleagues had found strong support for collective bargaining, probably enough to win the election. But no one was predicting victory. Too many faculty had said they were “undecided” about how they would vote.

This was the second time the SIUC faculty had voted on collective bargaining. In a 1988 election, almost 60 percent of the faculty voted against unionization. The vote that year was divided between the Faculty Association and another campus group affiliated with the Illinois Federation of Teachers. The competition between

the two groups had been a serious problem.

But the main factor in 1988 was the university’s active—and expensive—campaign against unionization. A top-dollar Chicago law firm was paid over \$300,000 for efforts to delay the election and turn faculty sentiment against the unions.

The campaign for a second vote on collective bargaining began at the end of 1995. Cards were circulated for a full six months, from the end of February through the beginning of the fall semester. Just enough signatures were gathered by the first of September to file for an election.

Some of us in the Faculty Association thought the university might try to delay the vote, as it had with the previous election. But it didn’t, and the state Educational Labor Relations Board set November 14 as the election date.

This time, there were no major clashes between the Faculty Associ-

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ation and the university administration in the weeks leading up to the election.

We made no bones about our concerns with “lagging salaries” and other campus problems. But there was little rancor in the criticisms. On the other side, the administration generally ignored the Association and merely sent out memos reminding faculty to vote in the election.

Despite the low-key campaign, the turnout for the November 14 vote was heavy. The result: The Faculty Association won a decisive victory, with 388 voting in favor of collective bargaining and 238 voting against. Over 85 percent of the faculty in the bargaining unit had voted in the election.

The weeks after the election saw a lot of discussion about why the vote turned out as it did. Many attributed the yes vote to low salaries. Others cited an erosion of faculty influence in university affairs. Still others pointed to a string of blunders and bad decisions by campus administrators. The reasons all sounded plausible, but no one really knew for sure why we won.

So, midway through the 1997 spring semester, I sent out a questionnaire to a random sample of about a third of the bargaining

unit.¹ The survey was a five-page list of questions about people’s attitudes towards the administration and campus conditions, how they voted in the 1988 and 1996 elections, their reasons for voting “yes” or “no” each time, and a number of background characteristics.²

Over the course of the 1996 organizing campaign, my SIUC colleagues had to make three decisions about unionization. They had to decide whether or not to sign an authorization card, whether to vote “yes” or “no” in the representation election, and whether or not to join the union.³

In analyzing my survey data and some additional information gleaned from union records on how people made up their minds, I paid close attention to factors identified as “important” or “significant” in previous studies of union organizing.

To provide a context for better understanding the statistical findings, let us first look at what we did to build support for the union, from the card drive on through our post-election membership campaign.

As in all organizing efforts, we on the union side can take only partial credit for what happened. We were also greatly aided by blunders and mistakes by our university administration. Bad management clearly made it easier for many of my colleagues to see the value of “going union.” This is one of the

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obvious “lessons” to be drawn from our experiences here at SIUC. But that’s looking ahead.

When we began the campaign in 1995, university enrollment was down for the third year in a row, the administration was trying to implement a highly unpopular efficiency mandate from the state Board of Higher Education, and the faculty had been stiffed with another puny annual wage increase.

Only 11 people showed up for our first meeting to discuss unionization, but two were reporters. Stories about a possible drive to unionize the faculty appeared the next day in both the college and local newspapers. Two months later, shortly after Valentine’s Day, we sent a mass mailing of membership cards and a letter to about 750 full-time and 400 part-time faculty.

The mailing was followed up by a campaign of personal contact by activists in the Faculty Association.

Meetings of an organizing committee were held every three or four weeks, ostensibly to talk about what was going on in the card drive—who had been signed up, who would be talking to different prospects, and how to deal with resistance to unions.

Faculty being faculty, however, much time was also spent gossiping about the latest administrative

“horror” stories. No records were kept of these get-togethers other than some personal notes and “sign-up” sheets passed around to record attendance.

Faculty came to the meetings mainly as a result of knowing someone who was already involved. Some dropped out after a session or two, but most kept coming back. By the end of the spring semester about 20 or so were actively involved in the campaign.

Jim Sullivan, who had hung on as president of our tiny chapter since the 1988 election, and several other faculty were from the liberal arts college, but everyone else came from the technical side of the campus—from the sciences, engineering or a technical college.

Early talk about getting enough signatures to file for an election by the end of the spring semester quickly evaporated. Many faculty were upset and angry with the administration, but getting them to put their names on a card was another matter.

All too often, the faculty approached for a signature wanted to “think about it for awhile”—and then think some more. Some were uncertain about the value of unionization, while others were clearly afraid of administrative reprisals.

The organizing committee prepared a leaflet on several common “myths about collective bargain-

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ing.” We pointed out that collective bargaining was consistent with the professional stature of university professors, would provide real economic gains—without altering market differentials across disciplines or increasing teaching loads—and would not threaten faculty autonomy.

In early May, the organizing committee decided to narrow the focus of the campaign to full-time faculty. Only about two dozen of the 150 or so cards we’d gathered so far were from part-time faculty, and it looked like the drive would never reach the 30 percent mark if part-timers were kept in the bargaining unit.

We also decided at this meeting to become more critical of the university administration. The next mailing of cards went out on the back of a flyer titled “Who Defines Your Job Responsibilities?” Next to a cartoon showing SIUC Faculty dusting out offices and working on a switchboard, the flyer quoted recent statements by the university’s unpopular provost about how faculty would have to work on telemarketing campaigns to recruit students.

Two other card mailings sent out during the summer reminded faculty of the low pay raises they had received in recent years (often less than the rate of inflation) and of their lack of influence over the

choice of a new chancellor and other key decisions at the university.

By the end of September we had enough signatures to put the drive safely over the 30 percent level. A total of 239 faculty (or 32.4 percent) had signed the cards.

Somewhat to our surprise, the university did not challenge either the legitimacy of any of the authorization cards submitted to the state labor board or our petition, which included the request that part-time faculty be excluded from the bargaining unit (a change from the 1988 election). When we received word of the November 14 election date in early October, our response was elation—and then a collective, “Oh my God, that’s just six weeks from now.”

The card drive had been rather haphazardly organized, but Association activists did ultimately make some kind of personal contact with most of the faculty. In my 1997 survey, only 17 percent of my colleagues said they had never been asked to sign a card (as shown in Table 1).⁴

Some faculty members were more likely to support the card drive than others. Consistent with previous studies of faculty attitudes towards unionization, those lower in the SIUC pecking order—at the associate or assistant rank or at lower salary levels—were

more likely to sign an authorization card.⁵

By far, the strongest college support for the card drive was in Communications, followed by Engineering and Liberal Arts. The suprisingly strong support in Engineering—a traditionally conservative faculty—reflects the work of several strong Association members in the college.

What else influenced people to sign the cards? We had heard many expressions of faculty discontent with university conditions during the campaign. When I put together my 1997 survey, I included several questions to tap into these negative feelings.

Respondents were asked to

rank their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the university in five areas—teaching conditons, support for research, annual salary, amount of faculty influence on administrative decision-making, and general trustworthiness of SIU administrators. The results are shown in Table 2.

Those who signed the authorization cards tended to be much more disgruntled, especially in their views of university administrators.

Two of my questions dealt with the perceived instrumental value of unions. Not suprisingly, as seen in Table 3, card signers were much more likely to reject the claim that employees gain very little through unions or that professional employees shouldn't join unions.

What was going on with the faculty at SIUC was not at all unique, according to one highly regarded theory. As Wheeler and McClendon see it, these two conditions—dissatisfaction and an instrumental view of unions—are key psychological factors in any successful unionization drive.⁶

From the beginning of the campaign, we assumed that virtually all of those who signed an authorization card would be voting for collective bargaining in the election. But only slightly more than 32 percent of our colleagues had signed a card. So if we were to win the election, we would have to get a substantial number of those who didn't support the card drive to vote with us. And that's precisely what happened as is shown in my survey results in Table 4.

Our fear that it would be difficult to "reach" a sufficient number

TABLE 1
Faculty Signature of
Authorization Cards

GENDER (Percentage Signed)	
Female	28%
Male	34%
RANK (Percentage signed)	
Professor	26%
Associate Professor	36%
Assistant Professor	36%
COLLEGE AFFILIATION (Percentage signed)	
Agriculture	30%
Applied Sciences & Arts	32%
Business	16%
Communications	67%
Education	24%
Engineering	37%
Liberal Arts	35%
Library	4%
Science	32%
AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME	
Signed Card	\$4,966
Did not sign card	\$5,250

of these non-signers turned out to be wrong. Almost a third of them voted "yes" in the election. Why

they voted this way is certainly explained in part by their attitudes on university conditions, especially

TABLE 2

Level of Faculty Satisfaction With University Conditions
For Signers and Non-Signers of Authorization Cards

	Very/somewhat Satisfied	Neither	Very/somewhat Dissatisfied
Teaching Conditions			
Signed	38%	6%	56%
Didn't Sign	50%	12%	38%
Research Support			
Signed	35%	17%	48%
Didn't Sign	50%	25%	25%
Income			
Signed	23%	4%	73%
Didn't Sign	29%	6%	65%
Influence on Administrative Decisions			
Signed	2%	6%	92%
Didn't Sign	21%	25%	54%
Trustworthiness of Administrators			
Signed	6%	4%	90%
Didn't Sign	26%	18%	56%

TABLE 3

Faculty Views of the Value of Unions for Signers and
Non-Signers of Authorization Cards

	Agree	Neither	Disagree
Employees Gain Very Little Through Unions			
Signed	13%	20%	67%
Didn't Sign	26%	31%	45%
Professional Employees Shouldn't Join Unions			
Signed	6%	2%	92%
Didn't Sign	39%	23%	38%

on the issues of pay and administrative behavior.

As is seen in Table 5, these non-signers weren't quite as dissatisfied as those who signed the authorization cards, but they were still a cranky, disgruntled group. By contrast, faculty who voted "no" in the election reflect a much more sanguine view of university conditions.

The difference between faculty who voted "yes" and "no" is even more striking on the two questions dealing with attitudes towards unions. Here, as shown in Table 6, the overwhelming majority of those who voted "yes" reject notions that employees gain little through unions or that professionals shouldn't join unions. Those who voted "no" are much more likely to accept these claims, especially the idea that professionals don't belong in unions.

As in most political campaigns, our activities leading up to the November election were intended to do two things: persuade the "undecided" and mobilize the "committed."

In response to a question about whether the Faculty Association's publicity "affected your views about the need for collective bargaining," 66 percent reported that the publicity had no effect on their views.

Of those who said the publicity did influence them, 75 percent indicated that it did so in a positive way while the remainder said that it had a negative affect on their views about unionization.

As far as getting the "committed" mobilized to vote, we had to identify all the potential "yes" votes, pump up their interest in voting, and then remind them to vote right before and again on the day of the election.

We did a quite credible job with the canvass—identifying over 80 percent of the "yes" vote. And, when we did our last minute calling on election day, it was clear that almost all of these "yes" votes would be cast by the end of the day.

The administration's failure to mount an active campaign against the Faculty Association was apparently based on the mistaken belief that the faculty was still strongly opposed to collective bargaining.

Some administrators tried to explain away the outcome of the election as a simple "protest vote" that had nothing to do with unionization—and assured each other that most faculty would never join the Faculty Association and make it into a "real union."

The November vote demonstrated the old saw about employees opting for unions because of

TABLE 4

How Faculty Voted in November Election Among Signers and Non-Signers of Authorization Card

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Didn't Vote</u>
Signed	87%	11%	2%
Didn't Sign	33%	52%	15%

bad management. The university was filled with irritants. Department chairs ran some departments like petty tyrants, using office assignments, teaching loads and merit increases as rewards or punishments. One unfortunate fellow in the physics department wound up with office space in a janitor's closet after a run-in with his chair.

A "good old boys" network of longtime SIUC administrators maintained control over many assignments, from the departments on up through the colleges to

Anthony Hall.

The campus president and provost in the years right before the election were especially arrogant and routinely ignored faculty input on appointments and other decisions. And then there was the salary problem—all kinds of inequities within departments due to "salary compression" and favoritism, and the gaps between SIUC and other universities.

But, interestingly, as seen in Table 7, the practices that had the biggest impact on the "yes" voters

TABLE 5

Level of Faculty Satisfaction With University Conditions Among Faculty Voting "Yes" and "No" in November Election, with "Yes" Voters Subdivided According to Decision on Authorization Cards

		Very/somewhat Satisfied	Neither	Very/somewhat Dissatisfied
Teaching Conditions				
Yes:	Signed	34%	4%	59%
	Didn't Sign	44%	4%	52%
No:		54%	11%	35%
Research Support				
Yes:	Signed	32%	19%	49%
	Didn't Sign	40%	23%	36%
No:		61%	15%	24%
Income				
Yes:	Signed	17%	5%	78%
	Didn't Sign	12%	0%	88%
No:		43%	6%	51%
Influence on Administrative Decisions				
Yes:	Signed	3%	7%	90%
	Didn't Sign	8%	22%	72%
No:		28%	22%	50%
Trustworthiness of Administrator				
Yes:	Signed	7%	0%	93%
	Didn't Sign	12%	12%	76%
No:		34%	19%	47%

were those that dealt with governance issues.

We had often alluded to these governance problems in our campaign publicity, beginning with the mailings for the authorization cards. The topic had come up repeatedly at our issues forums. It was also a major concern for many of us in the Faculty Association, and we knew that we would be seeking some solutions to these governance problems when we got to the bargaining table.⁷

The election over, the Faculty

Association moved on to its next daunting task. We had a tiny dues-paying membership—a total of only 25—and this included several department chairs not in the bargaining unit.

No real effort had been made to recruit members, and there were a number of activists from the campaign who were not on the membership roster. We had a token officer, Jim Sullivan as president, and a small Executive Board made up of a couple of longtime members of the Association and several others

TABLE 6

Views of the Value of Unions Among Faculty Voting “Yes” and “No” in November Election, with “Yes” Voters Subdivided According to Decision on Authorization Cards

		<u>Agree</u>	<u>Neither</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
Employees Gain Very Little Through Unions				
Yes:	Signed	10%	17%	73%
	Didn't Sign	0%	19%	81%
No:		37%	35%	28%
Professional Employees Shouldn't Join Unions				
Yes:	Signed	0%	2%	98%
	Didn't Sign	0%	29%	80%
No:		64%	24%	11%

TABLE 7

Main Reason for Voting “Yes” In November Election

Empowerment of Faculty in University Governance	52%
Salary/benefit issues	30%
Recognition of Professional Values	11%
Job Security Concerns	6%
Colleague Influence/Pressure	1%

We had learned about mutual interest bargaining from our UniServ Director and it sounded like the way to go.

who had been recruited during the campaign. That was the sum total of our “leadership.”

We did have an “approved” constitution (Jim Sullivan had found it in a box of junk shortly before the election), but it didn’t provide much guidance. It prescribed three officers, an executive board, and something called a “representative council.” There was some vague language on elections and a totally incoherent section on amending the constitution. And that was it.

By the middle of March, our dues-paying membership was up to 225. Our other major concern during this time was getting prepared for negotiations. We had a negotiating team and we had a functioning Bargaining Communications Council made up of department reps to give advice and feedback to the negotiating team.

Before the negotiations, Jim Sullivan made a number of public statements about the Association wanting to have a “cooperative relationship” in its bargaining with the university. This wasn’t just rhetoric. We had learned about mutual interest bargaining from our Illinois Education Association UniServ Director Jim Clark at our executive board meetings, and mutual interest bargaining sounded like the way to go. But it isn’t what we got.

After an amicable first meeting

with the university negotiators, where they also talked about cooperation, we quickly saw another side when we presented an outline of our contract proposal. They didn’t like our uppity challenges of existing practices, and we didn’t like their pompous posturing—and all of the talk about cooperation ended.

Both sides were using the contentious language of positional bargaining. To gain more time to finish writing our full proposal to the university, we proposed a bare-bones interim agreement to take us through the next year. The proposal called for an across-the-board wage increase of 4 percent, a basic grievance policy, retention of all existing faculty positions, and a few other less important items.

The university rejected the proposal. No progress was made at a couple of subsequent sessions so we called for mediation.

By the time the mediator arrived, we had presented our full proposal to the university. It included a substantial salary increase and a major restructuring of university decision-making to give more power to the faculty.

After two lengthy sessions with the federal mediator, the administration presented a “last and final” offer for an interim agreement that

We set up an informational picket line and handed out leaflets urging people to ‘Help Us Avoid a Strike.’

included a 3 percent wage increase and a couple of other minor provisions. Our membership rejected the proposal.

Very little bargaining occurred the rest of the fall. In early October, the Association and university bargaining teams tried mutual interest negotiations once again. This time, both negotiating teams attended a training put on by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.

Our team was favorably impressed by the presentation, but the other side apparently regarded it as a waste of time, according to a confidential memo circulated by the university’s lead negotiator.

The administration team now included an attorney from the Chicago law firm that had been used in the university’s 1988 fight against unionization, and the university’s bargaining stance became even more hardline and positional.

In January, a newly formed Crisis Response Team began meeting every week. One of its first moves was to survey all faculty, ostensibly to find out how many would be willing to participate in different protest activities. But we also wanted the administration to know we were thinking of escalating the level of conflict.

The survey indicated that we would have to do a lot of pumping up of our colleagues to pull off an

effective strike action; only 38 percent said they would participate in a strike.

Almost 200 faculty showed up for an open discussion with the negotiating team and other Association leaders in mid-February. Everyone at the meeting got a flyer detailing the sorry statistics on SIUC—tenure track positions (going down), administrative costs (going up), and faculty salaries (dead last in most comparisons).

On March 23, we set up an informational picket line around Anthony Hall and handed out leaflets urging people to “Help Us Avoid a Strike” and E-mail or call university president Ted Sanders. The picketing was the lead story on all the local TV newscasts that night. Another batch of leaflets was handed out on April 1 to the many students and parents attending the university’s Honor Day convocations.

The Association declared an impasse in the contract talks on April 5 after a bizarre exchange of “settlement” proposals with the university and a flurry of attempts by both parties to negotiate the contract in the press.

The federal mediator this time insisted that both sides observe a “media blackout.” And this seemed to help. Sessions were scheduled more frequently than before, and

our bargaining team began talking about getting tentative agreements on different items.

Six weeks after resuming the negotiations, we reached a settlement.

On the big ticket item, wages, everyone would get a 3.5 percent lump sum payment for the previous year (1997-98) and an across-the-board increase of 8 percent in 1998-99. A 5 percent merit allotment would be available in 1999-2000.

The faculty's main gain was the creation of "operating papers," which would give departments the right to write their own rules on everything from tenure and promotion guidelines, merit criteria, and committee responsibilities to defining the job function of chairs and how chairs will be evaluated.

Overall, the proposed settlement was definitely better than what the administration had offered in December but far from what the Association had asked for the previous summer.

The departmental representatives recommended approval of the settlement by a margin of 37 to 2. In the subsequent mail-in vote, the membership of the Faculty Association approved the agreement by a vote of 288 to 24.

The approval of the contract was a big step for the Association. Our success in getting it was certainly related to our membership recruitment effort. As shown in Table 8, there were some differences between the colleges, but we had built a very credible membership presence everywhere on campus.

Another crucial factor in our contract fight was the number of active members in the Association. Throughout this period, we had a

inner core of 40 to 50 people working on the various committees and attending the meetings of our decision-making bodies.

These activists made the recruiting calls, researched the issues, drafted contract language, talked to legislators, got the newsletters out and gave the Faculty Association an articulate presence everywhere on campus. Notes our UniServ director, Jim Clark: "In my 25 years of experience, I've never seen so many people actively involved in an Association."

About a third of the faculty in American higher education has been organized.⁸ That leaves a large number who still lack union protection. The chances of organizing the unorganized depend to a large degree on the management of these campuses.

If campus administrators mishandle some of the current hot-button issues such as post-tenure review, distance learning, and employment of "temps" (part-time

TABLE 8

Percentage of Faculty in
Each College Who Belong to
Faculty Association
July 1998

Agriculture	55%
Applied Sciences & Arts	48%
Business	43%
Communications	72%
Education	51%
Engineering	61%
Liberal Arts	55%
Library	48%
Science	47%

A well organized campaign to win an election involves a two-way flow of communication to and from the voters.

faculty), they certainly create an opportunity for union advocates. The growth of bureaucratic management on our campuses means that faculty are less likely to play a role in campus governance.

The shift in power may be quite gradual, and perhaps not even perceived as a loss by faculty. But when campus bureaucrats repeatedly call attention to their power, as happened here at SIUC, they create a climate of anger and alienation that can easily touch off a unionization drive.

Is this likely to occur on many campuses in the near future? That's hard to say. We may be a bit peculiar here in Southern Illinois, but I don't think we have a monopoly on dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior.

What happened here at SIUC in 1996 could happen almost anywhere. And when faculty on unorganized campuses do become involved with union-building efforts, they will go through a process much like the one we went through.

They will have to get the cards signed, win an election, recruit members, and build a credible organization, and then negotiate a contract. Here are a few practical suggestions for them based on our experiences at SIUC.

Don't Always Believe the

Experts. The law says that you have to get 30 percent of the members of a bargaining unit to sign authorization cards to qualify for an election. Union organizing lore, however, says that's not enough; you should get 50 percent, 60 percent, maybe even 70 percent before you file for an election. Well, we got just a tad over 32 percent of our colleagues to sign the cards, and we went on to win a smashing victory.

Elections Need to be Organized. The dynamic in representation elections is the same as the dynamic in elections for school board, mayor, governor, or any other public office. Some voters make their choices early on while others remain undecided for a period of time until the election. A well-organized campaign to win an election involves a two-way flow of communication—a stream of messages going out to the voters and an effort to get information from the voters about how they plan to vote.

This takes time and energy and isn't an especially enjoyable task, but all the communicating gives you valuable feedback on your campaign and allows you to mount an effective get-out-the-vote drive at the end.

Recruit Members Early. Waiting until after you win a representation election to build up your membership base, as we did, is not the way to go. It diverts time and energy

Sixty-four percent of the faculty I surveyed at SIUC said they had never belonged to a union.

from the crucial task of preparing for your first contract negotiations. Also, if you have good “numbers” at the beginning of the negotiations, you are in a better bargaining position.

Educating about Unions. Sixty-four percent of the faculty I surveyed at SIUC said they had never belonged to a union. When a faculty has not had much experience with unions, it means that an organizing group has to do a lot of educating about unions—what unions do, how they are organized, what goes on at the bargaining table, and so on.

During the election campaign, you need to persuade your colleagues of the general benefits provided by unions. After the election, you also have to start giving your members an understanding of the nuts and bolts issues involved in running a union.

Internal education should be done in a focused way, through newsletter articles, handouts to new members, and formal training sessions.

Resolve Constitution/Bylaw Issues Early. Unions, like all organizations, run much more effectively with clearly defined rules of procedure. We didn’t have a good constitution/bylaws and were constantly having problems because of it—confusion about who was responsible for what, fights over

inconsequential issues, and huge wastes of meeting time.

Much of this turmoil could have been avoided if we had resolved the problems in our constitution/bylaws early on.

Do Worry About the First Proposal. The first contract for any union establishes all kinds of precedents for subsequent contracts. So, it does make sense to devote a lot of time and energy to the initial proposal you bring to the table in negotiating your first contract.

We used “issues forums” during the election campaign to determine issues. Later, we had several standing committees (Teaching and Research, Faculty Welfare, Grievance, Minority and Women’s Rights, and Health/Safety) and then finally our Bargaining Communications Council, all of which provided input for the negotiating team.

Collective Bargaining Doesn’t Happen Just at the Bargaining Table. Unions can do a variety of things away from the table to win concessions from management.

We were aware of this within the Association. Copies of a research paper by Kate Bronfenbrenner, “Lasting Victories: Successful Union Strategies for Winning First Contracts,” had been circulated at an executive board meeting shortly before we started negotiations.⁹

Bronfenbrenner's thesis is that unions are much more likely to be successful with their first contract when "they use a multi-faceted, rank-and-file intensive campaign strategy involving internal and external organizing and pressure tactics."¹⁰

Bad Management Doesn't Change Overnight. One of the problems with bad management is that its practitioners don't really understand what they are doing wrong.

You would think that when they have to deal with a newly certified union, they would have some glimmering of what was going on, that maybe they should change what

they've been doing. This is not what happened at SIUC.

At the bargaining table, we continued to see the same behavior that had been so characteristic of our administrators. Eventually, they did make some significant concessions, but only because we were making it hot for them away from the bargaining table.

The literature on newly formed unions indicates that what happened with us is not uncommon.¹¹ When you have had lots of problems in the past with management, you are likely to face a tough adversary during that first round of contract negotiations. Be prepared. ■

Endnotes

¹ Specifically, it went out to 238 of the 716 faculty listed at that point in time in the bargaining unit.

² Completed questionnaires were sent back by 130 (or 54 percent) of the sample. This group of respondents was found to be quite similar to the bargaining unit on several known variables. On the vote for unionization, for example, 59 percent of the respondents voted "Yes" compared to 62 percent in the bargaining unit.

³ Illinois law mandates an agency shop for university and all other educational bargaining units.

⁴ Here I combined union data on card signatures with university data on gender, rank, college affiliation and income.

⁵ See Garbarino, 1975.

⁶ Wheeler and McClendon, 1991. Also see Fiorito, Gallagher, and Greer, 1986.

⁷ For a discussion of the impact of governance in the unionization of another campus, see Carey, 1978.

⁸ Maitland and Hendrickson, 1994.

⁹ Bronfenbrenner, 1996.

¹⁰ Bronfenbrenner goes on to detail more

than a dozen elements of effective union campaign strategy, everything from "one-on-one organizing" and "active membership participation in issue selection and program development" to "an active role for the rank-and-file bargaining committee" and "an emphasis on open negotiations with regular reporting to the members in newsletters and membership meetings." Ultimately, the Association did go on to use almost all of the tactics cited by Bronfenbrenner. And they worked!

¹¹ See Gagala, 1983, and Lawler, 1990.

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